Pistolero
Well-Known Member
I went back to "Blackshoe Carrier Admiral" and reviewed the chain of command and it was a mess.
Nimitz had told Ghormley "to exercise strategic command in person" for the whole area, and yet
at the last minute, Ghormley, the night they sailed for Guadalcanal put not only TF-61 ( three carrier
task forcess) under Fletcher but also told Fletcher to also take "tactical command" of all the forces.
So, yes, technically Fletcher was given tactical command. I had forgotten that, because it really didn't
actually happen that way when things went down. The reality of exceptionally poor radio
communications and huge distances between the amphibious and air task forces meant that
Fletcher was out of contact with the amphibious forces for days at a time,
and many times radio traffic was totally missed or passed on from another ship the following day.
There were a number of extremely critical lost messages that, had they been recieve in a timely
manner would have made significant differences in how things turned out.
In reality, Fletcher only commanded his TF-16 (Saratoga and support ships) and then reasonably effectively
TF11 and 18, (which were the other two carrier task forces) due to the fact that the carrier task forces intentionally
stayed widely separated, many tens of miles, so that if Japanese search planes found one carrier, they wouldn't
be able to attack all three. The dispersion had that advantage but the disadvantage of very poor strike
coordination, a serious problem at the early stages of the war. Later in the war, carriers fought in groups,
and within sight of each other.
Turner and Crutchley (TF-44) were effectively operating independently, following the battle plan
agreed to in Pearl and Aukland, since radio communication was just short of hopeless on a short
term basis. Typically Fletcher was hundreds of miles from Turner at any given time. For example, during
the landings the carriers were south of Guadalcanal and the landings were on the north side. Things just
ran according to preplanned schedules set days and weeks earlier.
Bret, if you would like, I will mail you my copy of "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" and you can read a lot
more about Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal in a very detailed, well written book.
Nimitz had told Ghormley "to exercise strategic command in person" for the whole area, and yet
at the last minute, Ghormley, the night they sailed for Guadalcanal put not only TF-61 ( three carrier
task forcess) under Fletcher but also told Fletcher to also take "tactical command" of all the forces.
So, yes, technically Fletcher was given tactical command. I had forgotten that, because it really didn't
actually happen that way when things went down. The reality of exceptionally poor radio
communications and huge distances between the amphibious and air task forces meant that
Fletcher was out of contact with the amphibious forces for days at a time,
and many times radio traffic was totally missed or passed on from another ship the following day.
There were a number of extremely critical lost messages that, had they been recieve in a timely
manner would have made significant differences in how things turned out.
In reality, Fletcher only commanded his TF-16 (Saratoga and support ships) and then reasonably effectively
TF11 and 18, (which were the other two carrier task forces) due to the fact that the carrier task forces intentionally
stayed widely separated, many tens of miles, so that if Japanese search planes found one carrier, they wouldn't
be able to attack all three. The dispersion had that advantage but the disadvantage of very poor strike
coordination, a serious problem at the early stages of the war. Later in the war, carriers fought in groups,
and within sight of each other.
Turner and Crutchley (TF-44) were effectively operating independently, following the battle plan
agreed to in Pearl and Aukland, since radio communication was just short of hopeless on a short
term basis. Typically Fletcher was hundreds of miles from Turner at any given time. For example, during
the landings the carriers were south of Guadalcanal and the landings were on the north side. Things just
ran according to preplanned schedules set days and weeks earlier.
Bret, if you would like, I will mail you my copy of "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" and you can read a lot
more about Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal in a very detailed, well written book.
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