Blackpowder cartridges......Fletcher class WW2 DD torpedo launching

[Pistolero]

Ha! if that isn't way off topic. But, I mentioned in Ben's thread a friend who told a story to my USN father when I was a teen, overheard by me.
My friend was a USN Chief Gunners Mate on the Fletcher-class DD (destroyer) the USS O'Bannon. In a night surface action, what I remember him
telling my father was - approximately. This would have been about 1968, but as I remember it.

"It was a night battle off of Guadalcanal, and we got in a terrible fight with Jap cruisers and battle wagons. My skipper got us in really close to a
battlewagon, inside a thousand yards. The normal firing mechanisms had been shot away, so I set the gyro course as best as I could judge it,
and then lined up that Jap battle wagon by sighting down the tubes. I had to fire them with a wooden mallet, it set off blackpowder cartridges
which launched them. I got two hits on that damned Jap b*****d of five torpedoes, and covered in packing grease blowback every time I fired one."
He was clearly fiercly proud of that achievement.

The Presidential Unit Citation for USS O'Bannon, citing the action off of Guadalcanal, says that the O'Bannon put three torpedoes into the Japanese
Batleship IJN Hei. In other sources, the Hei was damaged in the night action (no precise causes sourced in most reports) and couldn't get away,
and was sunk in the morning by US aviation assets.

From the Presidential Unit Citation: http://destroyerhistory.org/fletcherclass/index.asp?pid=45008
"Launching a close range attack on hostile combatant ships off Guadalcanal on the night of November 13, 1942, the O’BANNON scored three torpedo hits on a Japanese battleship, boldly engaged two other men o’ war with gunfire and retired safely in spite of damage sustained. "

So, I wondered, how much of all this is provably true, at this late date with all the people there long dead and only my memory of his brief description
as "testimony"?

So, I started looking online. I found the Presidential Unit Citiation, linked above, and then I found out that the Fletcher-class DDs used Mk15 21" torpedoes.
Couldn't find much on the launchers except some pix, five tubes on a turret, with a cover on top for the local firing positions.

Then I found the mother lode! https://maritime.org/doc/destroyer/ddtubes/index.htm
A copy of the original USN manual, " 21-inch Above Water Torpedo Tubes, Mark 14 and mods and Mark 15 and Mods - description, operation and maintenance.
All the gory details of exactly how this system worked. So, I dove in to learn about it.

I already knew that there was a complex electro-mechanical computer (on the bridge, I think) which the torpedo officer could enter ship's heading and
speed, the target heading and speed, and range, and the torpedo computer would calculate a collision course speed and heading, and sent that info
to the torpedoes. They could be electrically launched from the bridge, an electrical charge firing the primer on the large BP cartridge. And there was
a backup remote hydraulic firing mechanism which would trigger a hammer to hit an exposed firing pin, powered by a spring to fire it remotely by
hydraulics, presumably if the electrics were shot out. And finally there was a cable operated firing system, which could be fired by the two torpedomen
sitting on the mount, where they had cranks to set the torpedo gyro heading and select the speed. They could pull a handle to fire each of the five tubes.

So, what about my friend's story of firing them with a mallet? Is that possible or just an old sea story? Looking closer, the firing pin projects out of the back
of the firing chamber, and the safety is to pull the hammer back (it slides on a rod rather than pivots) and rotate it 90 deg left so it cannot hit the firing pins.
So, if the electrical remote firing was out, and the Torpedo Director was offline, then remote hydraulic firing could be tried. If that was out, the manual, on the
mount cable firing could be tried. If they were shot away or damaged so they couldn't be used....what to do? Triply redundant systems....all gone. But that
firing pin is just sticking out there. looks like about 4 1/2 ft off the deck. Hit it with a mallet and the torpedo will fire.

No doubt in my mind that Chief Gunner's Mate Spracklin was telling the straight story of a "not in the book" method of desperation firing of DD torpedoes
when all three of the firing circuits are shot away.

Some pix - first a Fletcher-class DD, I have added an arrow to show one of the two five tube torpedo mounts. The other is hidden by a boat fwd of the
clearly seen one.



Some details on the mount, which is rotated sideways to fire.



The firing mechanism - in operation.


See how the hammer swings sideways for safety? When it is "safe" a mallet hit on the FP should fire it just fine.


I hope this interests at least a few here.

Bill

 

[Bret4207]

Pretty basic and cool stuff. Smack'er and ploomp goes the fish! I like it!

Something else that was pretty amazing in the line of WW2 stuff- Before Cmdr Winfield Scott Cunningham chickened out and surrendered Wake Island, the Marines there managed to score some hits on Jap vessels using shore guns without the aiming gear. They pretty much guessed, waited till they got close and took the shots! IRC they severely damaged or sunk one vessel. If your interested, try "Left for Dead", subtitled something like "The Marines and the defense of Wake Island". Doesn't paint a very flattering picture of Cmdr Cunningham at all, but dang man!, he had a cool name that looked great in print so he musta been a he-ro!

 

[Pistolero]

I never heard much about the defense of Wake, other than it was a pretty overwhelming force that hit them, and
we were, at that stage of the war, in no position to provide much help. The IJN had four big deck carriers in the
area and we were outnumbered by a lot.
Six months later, June of 42, we put 4 of the IJN's big deck carriers on the bottom in the Battle of Midway, and the odds were
much more even. By Dec of 42 the first of our new big deck carriers, USS Essex, was in commission, not ready for battle until
the air group was on board and had done their 'workups' (training), she was in the Pacific in May of 43, didn't do major
fighting until Oct. New Essex class carriers were hitting the water about every month or two after that, and we wound up
the war with 25 or 26 big deck carriers and a total of 104 carriers including the smaller escort carriers.

Dark days at first, and Wake was hit just days after Pearl Harbor.

 

[Bret4207]

I never heard much about Wake either, I just happened to stumble on that book back when I was still working and would hit the "big city" library quite often. Yes, overwhelming odds, but the Marines were willing and able to fight on. It was Cunninghams decision to give it up. I can see both sides of it, but he was sort of made a hero and I don't see that at all. Major Devereux and his near 500 Marines put up a valiant fight and inflicted far, far heavier losses on the Japanese than they suffered. They could have gone on at least several more days, or a week, and delayed the Japanese that much longer. It's one of those unknown stories of WW2, like the defense of the Aleutians or Fearless Frank Fletchers decision to drop the Marines on Guadalcanal and then beat feet without off loading what they needed to fight with. The Marines on Guadalcanal ran out of food and almost out of ammo. I understand wanting to protect your fleet, but he did the Marines no favors at all, none, not a one. OTOH, Adm Kimmel, in charge of Pearl on 12/7/41, had done exactly what he was expected and told to do. Yes, he had to be the sacrificial lamb, but how he ended up being a scapegoat while MacArthur ended up some type of mythical god of war with all his blunders and hissy fits is beyond me. Must be the Marine perspective!

 

[462]

Bret said " . . . or Fearless Frank Fletchers decision to drop the Marines on Guadalcanal and then beat feet without off loading what they needed to fight with. The Marines on Guadalcanal ran out of food and almost out of ammo. I understand wanting to protect your fleet, but he did the Marines no favors at all, none, not a one. OTOH, Adm Kimmel, in charge of Pearl on 12/7/41, had done exactly what he was expected and told to do. Yes, he had to be the sacrificial lamb, but how he ended up being a scapegoat while MacArthur ended up some type of mythical god of war with all his blunders and hissy fits is beyond me. Must be the Marine perspective!"

Even this ol' Air Force guy agrees. Though the victors get to write history, seems it's the military's elites who tell the writers what to write.

 

[Pistolero]

At that time of the war, we totally forget that the USA had a grand total of 3 available aircraft carriers in the Pacific. Frank Jack Fletcher was
entrusted with these precious, critical to have, literally irreplacable assets. The original orders specified that the carriers COULD NOT
STAY during daylight more than a couple of days because, at that time, the Japanese had extremely effective land based torpedo
bombers, the Betty, and had been extremely successful at sinking large capital ships. The Brits had lost HMS Prince of Wales and
HMS Repulse in the Indian Ocean only about 7 months earlier. The Prince of Wales was one of the most advanced battleships
in existence with radar laid guns, radar guided AA guns and the most modern anti-torpedo armor belt. In addition to the long
range land bombers from Rabaul, the Japs had many effective subs in the area. The aircraft carrier USS Saratoga was out of
action for many months due to a submarine attack in Jan 42. Hornet was at Pearl rearming with a replacement airgroup after
massive losses at Midway (June 42) , Lexington sunk at Coral Sea (April 42) , and Yorktown sunk at Midway (June 42).

If Frank Jack Fletcher had remained close and fixed in position any longer, he would have lost his carriers. In fact, a few months
later, when he was ordered to defend a small area east of Guadalcanal, and therefore had to frequent this small, limited
area, the USS Wasp, pulled out of the Atlantic to support the rapidly dwindling carrier fleet in the Pacific, was lost to a submarine
only a month after the landings at Guadalcanal, and not far from Guadalcanal. The Jap subs knew where to wait and
eventually they got a shot.

The Essex boats were coming in 43, and Frank Jack Fletchers unenviable job was to fight the few carriers we had left as effectively as
we could but without excessive risk, since we had already lost two carriers of our 7 combat carriers, and one in the yard for many months.
The commander of the transports delivering the Marines and supplies to Guadalcanal never was willing to risk his ships
staying without aircraft carrier cover, and for that reason, I put much, most of the blame on him. We had PLENTY of ordinary
transports, and could afford to have some sunk getting supplies ashore. We did NOT have plenty of aircraft carriers and
husbanding these precious resources, while using them as a powerful MOBILE striking force, where they could appear from
an unknown direction, strike and be gone, was far more critical and survivable than cruising in a small area to protect fixed
assets unloading at Guadalcanal. That was a literal suicide mission. The carriers had to MOVE around.

In fact, this was well know AND AGREED TO by all parties before the mission was planned. The Marine commander and the
transport fleet commander knew that Fletcher could not remain in the area, and yet they screamed bloody murder when the
plan that they knew about was carried out. Another critical factor that is universally overlooked is that Fletcher's carriers needed
lots of destroyers to even attempt to stop submarines, and they had very "short legs". He had to withdraw relatively frequently
to refuel his carriers but more critically, to refuel his destroyers. His first withdrawal was after losing one fifth of his fighting
strength (aircraft) and in a low fuel condition.

I think Frank Jack Fletcher did a good job, at a very, very difficult time for the USN and was ultimately punished by King for that.
Even Halsey, taking over later acknowledged that carriers could not stay in a small area for long and survive. I was never much
of a fan of King, and think he was cut of similar cloth as MacArthur, pompous and "never wrong", and nobody could tell King a thing.

 

[Rick H]

The Japs owned the night. We were just figuring out radar and didn't fully understand its use. The Japanese had superior night vision optics and more importantly more training and expertise in nighttime operations. We had few capital ships to protect our carriers and supply ships after August...and the battle off Savo Island. The situation was worse. The Pacific fleet battlewagons were damaged or sunk in a smoldering Pearl Harbor. We lost 4 heavy cruisers and had nothing to protect the carriers or the supply ships with.
My Dad's ship the heavy cruiser USS Astoria was one of them sunk with 249 killed and almost as many wounded or missing out of a crew of under 900. . To keep the supply ships there would have been suicidal. There was no lack of courage or sacrifice on the part of the Navy:
"Over 1,700 US Marines, over 400 US Airmen, and nearly 5,000 US Sailors perished at Guadalcanal"

The marines had it tough to be sure....but the Navy more than paid the price to put them there.

 

[Bret4207]

They have these things in the military called "orders". I understand exactly why Fletcher didn't want his carriers and capital ships in the shoal waters around Guadalcanal. But that was no excuse for not leaving smaller vessels with the supply ships and at least trying to get the supplies ashore where they were needed. Inexcusable IMO. But like I say, that's a Marines view.

Rick, this is not meant to reflect on your fathers or any average sailors intestinal fortitude, or even the Navys in general. Leaving the Marines to without supplies was nearly murder. So suicide or murder, what a choice!

 

[Pistolero]

Fletcher was not in command of the fleet with the troops and the supliess. There was a seperate admiral who was in
charge of the amphibious force and he should have stayed, his ships WERE expendible and replaceable in shorter
period of time. This was Adm Kelly Turner, a close friend of Adm King, who commanded the entire Navy. He
planned to pull back most of the amphibious force on D+2, and leave a few transports unloading. Fletcher
warned them that D+2 (three days total) was as long as the carriers could stay close in. Then he had to run
out to sea at night, and come back within aircraft range in the day, to give them the best support he could
provide with acceptable risk.

Everyone assumes that Fletcher had overall command, but Admiral Turner wasin charge of the "amphibious force".
Fletcher told Turner during the planning that he could only stay three days before he had to pull back for fuel
and to keep from having the carriers swarmed by subs and land based planes. Turner confidently insisted that
he could get all the men and supplies off in two days after D day (total of 3 days). These two independent
commands were working on a preplanned schedule. Fletcher had three of our four carriers with him, Saratoga,
Enterprise and Wasp. 3/4 of your eggs in one basket. Everyone forgets that Fletcher was low on fuel, too. They had
not been doing so many high speed combat runs, and all ships were using more fuel than in peacetime. Later
in the war, we allowed for this, but this was only months in and lessons were being learned.

Later Turner lied and said that he had predicted it would take five days to unload troops and equipment. That is
not what was in the battle plan, and Fletcher had warned Turner that he absolutely could not stay longer,
too much risk to the irreplaceable and critical carriers.

Adm Ghomley, far away, and out of communication was in overall charge. Fletcher was in charge of the
carrier task force, and stuck to the mission plan. Turner was in charge of the amphibious landing force, and
the Marine general was in charge of the shore troops. Turner did pull out before the supplies were all
off loaded, but again - on the planned day. The problem was that unloading supplies took far longer
than planned.

I recommend an excellent, detailed book, "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" by Lundstrom, which goes to original
sources and covers the history of the beginnings of the naval conflict in the South Pacific, covering the
battles of Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal with Frank Jack Fletcher in great detail. An excellent read,
and puts a hugely different light on events from what Turner and King twisted them into in the press, long after
the fact, seeking to push all blame onto Fletcher, and deflect it from themselves.

Everyone knows that events were very hard on the Marines, but Turner and King deflecting blame later for the
inexperience and slow unloading in our amphibious forces in off loading in combat doesn't become them, and unfairly
blames Fletcher who was following the plan, and following Nimitz's orders to preserve the carriers and only risk them in
a direct confrontation with the Japanes carriers. Getting them sunk by subs or land planes was something
to be avoided at all costs. We still had to fight a number of Japanese carriers, and it wouldn't be until the
following summer when the new Essex carriers would arrive in the Pacific.

 

[Bret4207]

I guess we're going to agree to disagree on this one Bill. While I don't hold Fletcher in the same disdain I hold McA, I really don't think it matters much at this point who left the Marines with maybe half of what they were in desperate need of. It shouldn't have been done, just like a lot of things shouldn't have been done. True, the Marines came through and it ended okay, but someone dropped the ball someplace and the whole mess was made much harder either through a lack of foresight and planning or maybe some other actions or inactions. The carriers were invaluable, I know. I don't imagine I'd want to be sitting on a boat waiting for supplies to be offloaded and wondering when a torpedo would hit or a squadron of bombers would appear. But, that's the job. Just like being dropped off on an enemy held island with half your gear is. Either way, someone up the ladder screwed the pooch and the grunts paid the price.

IIRC the Marine General in charge was Alexander Vandergrift, later Commandant of the Marine Corps, a man revered by Marines in the same way sailors might revere Halsey or Nimitz or soldiers might revere Patton, Bradley or Ike.

 

[462]

Thanks, Bill. ". . .and puts a hugely different light on events from what Turner and King twisted them into in the press, long after the fact, seeking to push all blame onto Fletcher, and deflect it from themselves."

Seems I've read the wrong books, and kind of goes along with my previous post about elites and their writing of history.

 

[freebullet]

Neat finds, Bill.

Whackamole cannons can gitr'did.

 

[Pistolero]

I'm fine with that, Bret. I never take any sort of discussion like this personally, and no offense taken in any sort
of a historic disagreement. All in good fellowship and discussion. If you can get your library to get a copy
of "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral", I think you would enjoy it. All the fine details or exactly what happened in the
South Pacific in the first few desperate months of WW2 with the USN. A VERY steep learning curve, and lots of
hard lessons.

It just amazes me that everyone assumes that Fletcher commanded the amphibious group, when he did not, and wasn't
even in reliable comms with them. How in the hell does Adm. Kelly Turner, who actually gave the orders to pull out the
ships without fully unloading them, get entirely off the hook to the point that nobody even knows he was there, in charge and
made the decision? History is not always written evenly, and King didn't like Fletcher and a lot of stuff was dumped on
Fletcher. Fletcher never is remembered as the task force commander who sunk six Japanese carriers, he is remembered
as "the guy who left the Marines without enough supplies on Guadalcanal"....when he wasn't.

The decision was made early in the planning that even if they had to pull out the ships before they were unloaded that the Marines
would not be able to be dislodged by the few Japanese troops on the island before the ships could return and finish off-loading.
They all didn't like it, and I think Adm Turner believed he could unload that quickly, out of inexperience. The reality was that
the Marines got shelled a lot by Jap destroyers, and cruisers a couple of times, and had to eat captured Japanese rice and canned fish for
a while, but they made it OK. And the carriers survived (until the Wasp was sunk) and Turner eventually got the supplies back to them
later. The good news of the Saratoga torpedoing (a month after the landings) was that they took most of the fighters and dive bombers
off of her before she went to the yard and the crews& planes fought at Henderson Field for months. It turns out stripping the air group and
moving it ashore was a critical piece of holding Guadalcanal. The whole damned operation was a near run thing for four desperate months, with
the Navy getting supplies in as best they could, and replacement airplanes as fast as they could get them out there. The pilots
and Marines (some were both) we worn ragged from the fighting in horrible living conditions, but they saw it through.

Holding Guadalcanal was very important, but ultimately, from the view of years later, the most important part of the Guadalcanal
Campaign turned out to be the horrible attrition of Japanese aviators. Their system was unable to train aviators in less than about 5 years
to the level that they had at the start of the war. So for every US air-to-air victory over Guadalcanal or the Slot, they lost a
literally irreplaceable experienced pilot. Our system and society could create pilots in 2 years from scratch and that became a
crucial strength that the Japanese could never match. Plus, since our pilots were fighting over or close to their base, even if shot
down, many survived and flew again. Some of our top pilots got shot down 3 to 5 times, and continued on. The Japanese had
to fly hours back to Rabaul in shot up aircraft, and often didn't make it.

 

[Bret4207]

"The decision was made early in the planning that even if they had to pull out the ships before they were unloaded that the Marines
would not be able to be dislodged by the few Japanese troops on the island .." The "few" Japanese troops? The Marines landed less than 11,000 of their initial 19,000 men to face off against more than 36,000 entrenched Japanese who had naval support every night and day time air support. No, the Marines wouldn't be "dislodged" because they had nowhere to go and no way to get there! BTW- The Marines at that time were armed with '03 Springfields. They didn't get the M1's until much later. I suppose that did help conserve the under supplied ammo.

Why does Fletcher get the blame? Because he was in charge of the Task Force! Yes, you can look up the ladder or down or across, but it was his Task Force and he removed the much needed (and planned for) air cover sooner than expected. With air over gone, Turner scooted shortly thereafter. I understand why, but it was a piss poor operation from day 1.

Yup, the Navy took some hard, hard hits early on. It's pure luck we did as well as we did in some ways. I put much of the wins/loss avoidance down to American flexibility vs Japanese inflexibility. Our guys, most of them, learned pretty quick on their feet, be it Marines in the jungles, sailors on the sea or pilots in the air. Of course what really helped was that, for the most part, our nation turned to a war production mindset, just as England had and later Russia did. The Axis boys all thought they could overwhelm the peons and seize the means of production and supply. They might have done it if they hadn't drawn the US into direct conflict.

 

[Pistolero]

Fletcher was in only in charge of the carriers, and he was not in command of the amphibious task force, that was Adm. Kelly Turner. They were two separate commands. This was, in hindsight, an error, but it is what was done.

Certainly, having the overall commander Adm. Ghormley, far away, with very unreliable radio comms was a tactical error, but both sides were
making a lot of errors in those days. And Turner (amphibious task force commander) knew that the carriers could not stay past three days,
from the initial planning on. Turner insisted that he would be able to get everything ashore in that time. Turner was wrong, I am sure due
to inexperience, but even with only moderate air attacks, unloading was far slower than planned. This is one reason that the LSTs became such
a critical piece of technology later in the war. They could beach themselves and open the front doors and drive loaded trucks and tanks
directly ashore. In Guadalcanal, they lowered cargo into small boats, took them ashore and unloaded by manpower.

I checked my sources on Guadalcanal, and initially there were only about a thousand Japanese troops and ~2,300 Korean slave laborers there building the runway, on the island, and there was initially essentially no real resistance to our landing on Guadalcanal. It took the Japanese weeks of night destroyer transport trips to build up the troops that they had months later in the battle. Tulagi, the adjacent island had far more fierce fightng from day one and there were less than 1,000 Japanese on Tulagi. Nobody even remembers now that Tulagi even happened. At the beginning it was the far harder fight. Guadalcanal for the first two weeks was pretty much a picnic, except for the food shortages. The Marines used the time to build a formidable defensive ring around Henderson Field, so they were quite ready when the Japanese counterattacked.

We landed on Aug. 7, and the first major counterattack was Aug. 19, at Alligator Creek. Later, the Japanese began almost nightly troop landings, and we had our similar steady supply missions. Both sides had extreme difficulty getting things to Guadalcanal. The first major group of Japanese troops, ~900 men under the command of Col. Ichiki were landed about two weeks after we landed. They came in and attacked our prepared positions on Alligator Creek and found that charging into watercooled Browning .30 cal machineguns didn't work, even with 900 troops concentrated in a narrow area. The Marines took a lot of casualties, but held out and totally wiped out Ichiki's command. We had 11,000 troops at that time, and the Japanese seriously underestimated the number of troops they needed to send.

This sort of thing continued for months, we built up as fast as we could, as did the Japanese. Both sides were short on everything, all the time, but
the Japanese were worse off, generally.

I agree totally with your last paragraph.

Bill

 

[RBHarter]

Our pilots and air crews had it easy compared to the Axis .......
See Flight into Conquest also titled Bye Bye Blacksheep , Stuka Pilot and Baa Baa Blacksheep for the very real stark contrast .
Masijaro Kawato flew his first combat mission in early 1942 and was captured off Okinawa in 45' as it happens and was unknown to both pilots he shot down Greg Boyington when he was captured . He had many Mitsubishi Zeros throughout the war and engaged F4Us , P39s F8Fs , F6Fs and a P38 . He flew 4-8 hr sorties 6 days a week and was on scramble 16 weeks on 2 off ,2 weeks off the forward combat lines was what he was supposed to get for R&R but what he really got was freight escort and high altitude recon . He was in basically continuous combat or combat support in a fighter for 4 years .

The pilot that wrote Stuka Pilot flew his first combat mission in September 1939 and surrender to allied forces the morning after VE in Italy with his remaining 5 squadron members . He flew 300 regular sortes per year into 1943 and 450+ through the end of the war . At one point after taking a 20 mm shell through the cockpit and breaking his ankle his crew carried him out to a Foke Wolf 190E in his cast with the ankle still bleeding to fly a bomber intercept .

Boyington spent 42 until his capture , 2 weeks combat , 1 week 100+ knots behind the lines . Basically the Black Sheep were drunk or airborne . Regular shenanigans included only loading 4 guns developing engine vibration and having to put in on an island . The pilot in question would then buy beer and fill the empty magazine wells up climb up to 20,000 ft for "recon" and use a power off dive flaps decent to keep the beer cold . There was the repremand when supply figured out the squadron members couldn't eat that many cornflakes and had an unreasonably high sugar consumption rate .
Yep they had an excellent combat record but their chute packs wreaked of hangover sweat .

Japan and Germany required 32 confirmed solo kills air to air for Ace , doubles 2 on one , assisted by wingman , and 2fer enemy damaged aircraft hitting another enemy aircraft , weren't counted . There were a lot of German and Japanese double Aces and a few triple Aces . Even needing only 16 there weren't very many American double Aces . If I remember right Pappy only had 23 .

I know it wasn't like that for sea crews or ground Infantry but most were rotated out between missions and we almost always have had green zones for recovery . That and our ability to out supply the enemy and our innovation of air drop resupply etc were major advantages . Advantages that sometimes even made up for huge tactical blunders . I'd be willing to bet that there was more than one insubordinate flag ship captain that "misunderstood" orders and because it worked out the brass took credit for the success . Salvaging , night raids , out of formation , "lost" life boats etc ........
The Navy was a broken spirit after Pearl and the Corps was basically just angry because their ride was broken . Doolittle's boys restored a huge amount of faith in the Navy , suicidal , death wish hero's maybe but very motivational .
In the bigger picture those "failures" early on were the bedrock lessons that made places like Iwo Jima and Okinawa not only possible but successful .

Did you know that we actually sunk 2 of our carriers on purpose ?
My Uncle was on the Destroyer who's only combat claim to fame was sinking one of the 2 and Japan claimed that one also as it was still above water but sinking when they brought guns to bear .

Lots of mistakes made . Lots of lives because of them . Lots of Egos and manipulation of details no doubt .

 

[Bret4207]

RB, the Corps has an institutional habit of remaining angry. It's worked for well over 200 years!

Bill, everything I have seen, even recently, puts Fletcher in command of the Task Force. What I've seen puts Turner in a subordinate command. You can blame Turner for a lot of stuff. I think he was the one that didn't let Adm Kimmel know about warnings prior to the Pearl harbor attack, but if Fletcher had stayed a little longer... well, whats done is done.

I think you misunderstand how quickly the Japanese reinforced Guadalcanal and how long it took to get additional Marines there. I shouldn't have given the impression the island was garrisoned by 36K because I think that was total troops, but the numbers were in the enemies favor as was naval and air support. You also have to remember in addition to being on short rations (captured rations actually), 20% of the US forces were down with dysentery within a short time. Nasty battle.

Had the Marines not been able to capture the airfield and hold it I don't think it would have ended like it did. It took a couple weeks for the planes to really start working out of there and doing any real support. They had a nifty name for the little air group that escapes me. I do know the Japanese had a regular night time supply run into the area called the Tokyo Express. I have a good book on this buried here some place written by or in the USMC view. I'll have to see if I can find it.

My memory is hazy on this, but IIRC at the time all this stuff was going on, McA was in Australia complaining about his accommodations and what travel methods he and his Imperial court would be subjected to while fighting the Navy and asking Washington for more stars on his collar!

 

[Brad]

They were called the Cactus Air Force

 

[Pistolero]

Yes, the Axis pilots were in it until they died or the war ended, basically, with some R&R periodically. It meant that they had some
really, really expert pilots, but also they lost most of their pilots over time. Saburu Sakai (sp?) was hit with a bullet from
a tail gunner on a TBF in the eye, at Guadalcanal and blinded, had a long, long flight, in and out of conciousness back to Rabaul.
He was out a long time recovering, eventually worked back into the cockpit and was fighting at the end of the war, so he flew a
fighter from China thru '45. Not easy.

Our pilots at Guadalcanal had it pretty hard in many ways, but most who survived the horrible living conditions and the horrible
fighting conditions were rotated out after 6 months or less, as we finally got more pilots trained.

Guadalcanal was a long, difficult slog for both sides, each at the end of a very long supply chain, having difficulty supplying
troops, food and weapons to the fight. Add in the horrible jungle mud, rain and steep terrain and it was pretty nasty place
to be. It was a near run thing the whole time until finally in November the Japanese sent in 11 or 12 large transport ships of troops and supplies.
We sunk all but four of these transports the morning after a furious surface ship night battle which involved battleships, cruisers
and destroyers. The four remaining transports beached themselves on Guadalcanal, and started unloading but our aircraft, ships and
artillery shredded them, destroying most of the supplies. At this point, the entire Japanese force had been starving for weeks and
weeks, and without new supplies, and with several thousand fresh troops who made it off the transports....more mouths to feed
with no food.
That was pretty much the end of it and they started withdrawing troops, trying to save as many as they could.
You can see the wrecks of two of the transports on Google Earth.

 

[Pistolero]

Yes, Brad. The code name for either all of Guadalcanal, or perhaps just Henderson Field was "Cactus" so that
name stuck. And since they were a mixed lot of Army pilot with a few P400s (export versions of the P39 Aircobra
which had 20mm nose cannon, instead of our 37 mm nose cannon - originally built for the French air force...and
never delivered when France fell) and a few P39s, and USN and USMC F4F Grumman Wildcat fighters, USN Dauntless
dive bombers and a few Grumman TBF/TBM torpedo bombers, it was a mixed lot. They were scrounging any aircraft
that could be spared in the South Pacific, and any pilots. That the USS Saratoga aircraft carrier was torpodoed would
up being somewhat of a blessing since they sent pilot and aircraft ashore before the headed home for drydock
repairs which took months. Those pilots and aircraft probably made the difference in keeping Henderson Field
open for business by driving off and shooting down a lot more Japanese ships and aircraft than the Marine's
Wildcats could have done by themselves.